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Abstract. Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a
means to arrive at optimal conditions for resolving social dilemmas. Yet recent research
highlights that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the
structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce coevolution of strategy
and network interdependence to study whether it can give rise to elevated levels
of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. We show that the interdependence
between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of
cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions cooperators can prevail where
on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a
two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage
of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving to the
upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters
of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a
strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb, 89.65.-s
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1. Introduction
Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from human societies
to the Internet [1, 2, 3], and the structure and function of these networks have been
investigated intensely during the last fifteen years [4, 5, 6]. Only recently has the
traditional description of complex systems by means of individual networks begun giving
way to using multiplex or interdependent networks instead [7]. This is due to the
realization that the interdependence between networks might be just as important as
the structure of an individual network for the functioning of a system, and because
even small and seemingly irrelevant changes in one network can have catastrophic
consequences in other networks [8]. It has also been emphasized time and again that
the units constituting a complex system will rarely be connected by the same type of
links [9, 10], and that thus a single-network description of such systems inevitably entails
some loss of information and detail. Using interdependent rather than isolated networks
to describe complex systems therefore represents an important step forward towards a
more integrative understanding of their dynamics and evolution. Ample efforts have
already been invested in the research of cascading failures [8, 11, 12, 13], competitive
percolation [14, 15, 16, 17], transport [9, 10], diffusion [18], financial trading [19],
neuronal synchronization [20], as well as statistical mechanics [21] on interdependent
networks. Robustness against attack and assortativity have been studied as well
[22, 23, 24], and overall, networks of networks have evolved into a vibrant topic that is
of interest to researchers across social and natural sciences [25, 26, 27, 28, 29].
Evolutionary games [30, 31] have followed closely the many advances in network
science, and it is now thoroughly established that the structure of an interaction network
plays a key role by the evolution of cooperation [32, 33, 34]. While the seminal discovery
of network reciprocity is due to Nowak and May [35], subsequent works have highlighted
the importance of small-world [36, 37, 38], scale-free [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,
49, 50], as well as bipartite [51, 52] and coevolving [53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59] networks.
Coevolutionary games in particular, where besides strategies the interactions are subject
to evolution as well, have increased our understanding of the emergence of system
properties that facilitate the evolution of cooperation [60]. Most recently, evolutionary
games have also been studied on interdependent networks [61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66], and
it has been shown that the interdependence may give rise to new mechanisms that
promote the evolution of cooperation. Interdependent network reciprocity [65], complex
organization of cooperation across different network layers [62, 63], and information
sharing [66] are perhaps the most recent examples to demonstrate the case in point.
Emergence of the optimal network interdependence, however, has not yet been
studied. More precisely, while the consensus is that the interdependence can promote
the evolution of cooperation by means of the many aforementioned mechanisms, and
while it has been established that there in fact exists an optimal intermediate level of
interdependence that works best in deterring defection [67, 68], it is not clear how it could
have emerged from initially isolated subsystems. Previous works have simply assumed
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some level of interdependence be there without considering its origin or mechanisms
that might have led to its emergence. To amend this, we here adopt the established
concept of coevolution in the realm of the prisoner’s dilemma game [69, 70], with the aim
of introducing an elementary coevolutionary rule that leads towards the spontaneous
emergence of optimal interdependence between two initially completely independent
networks. The rule is simple indeed, assuming only that players who are often enough
successful at passing their strategy to one of their neighbors, regardless of which strategy
it is, are allowed to form an external link to the corresponding player in the other network
in order to potentially increase their utility. As we will show, this suffices for the system
to self-organize into a two-class society in which the resolution of the prisoner’s dilemma
is most likely, indicating that even seemingly irrelevant and minute additions to the basic
evolutionary process might have led to the intricate and widespread interdependence
between networks that we witness today in many social and technological systems.
In the remained of this paper, we first describe in detail the game entailing
coevolution between strategy and network interdependence, and then proceed with the
presentation of the results. Lastly we summarize the main conclusions and discuss their
potential implications.
2. Model
To begin with, players populate two independent square lattices of size L × L with
periodic boundary conditions. Each player on site x in network A (up) and on site x′
in network B (bottom) is initially connected only with its k = 4 nearest neighbors and
designated either as a cooperator (sx = C) or defector (sx = D) with equal probability.
The accumulation of payoffs pix and pix′ on both networks follows the same procedure.
Namely, each player plays the game with its four neighbors, whereby two cooperators
facing one another acquire R, two defectors get P , whereas a cooperator receives S if
facing a defector who then gains T . The prisoner’s dilemma game is characterized by
the temptation to defect T = b, reward for mutual cooperation R = 1, and punishment
P as well as the sucker’s payoff S equaling 0. Here 1 < b ≤ 2 ensures a proper payoff
ranking that captures all relevant aspects of the prisoner’s dilemma game [35], and it
also enables a relevant comparison with the many preceding works.
Since the coevolutionary rule (to be introduced below) may allow some players
to form an additional external link with the corresponding player from the other
network, the utilities used to determine fitness are not simply payoffs obtained from
the interactions with the nearest neighbors on each individual network, but rather
Ux = pix + αpix′. The parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 determines the strength of external
links, increasing the utility of the two connected players the more the larger its value.
Naturally, for players that are not linked with their corresponding players in the other
network, the utility remains unchanged and is equal to Ux = pix.
Following the determination of utilities, the strategy transfer is possible only
between nearest neighbors on any given lattice, but never between players residing
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on different networks even if they are connected with an external link. Accordingly,
on network A (and likewise on network B) player x can pass its strategy sx to one of
its randomly chosen nearest neighbor y with a probability determined by the Fermi
function
W (sx → sy) = wx
1
1 + exp[(Uy − Ux)/K]
, (1)
where K quantifies the uncertainty related to the strategy adoption process [32].
The scaling factor wx in Eq. 1 is key to the coevolutionary rule, and it also
determines how likely players will pass their strategy to one of their neighbors.
Traditionally wx is referred to as the teaching activity of players [71, 72]. Initially all
players are assigned a minimal teaching activity wmin = 0.01, but upon each successful
strategy pass wx is enlarged according to wx = wx + ∆, where 0 < ∆ < 1. Likewise,
if the attempted strategy pass is unsuccessful, the teaching activity is reduced by the
same value according to wx = wx − ∆. To avoid frozen states, all scaling factors are
kept between [wmin, 1] at all times. Crucially, only when the teaching activity satisfies
wx ≥ wth is player x allowed to have an external link to its corresponding player x
′ in
the other network. If wx drops below the threshold wth, the external link is terminated,
which in turn involves the loss of a potential additional payoff for those players who
unsuccessfully pass their strategy to the neighbors. The making and braking of the
links between the two networks thus serves as individual rewarding and punishment
that reflects the evolutionary success within a network.
Simulations are performed by means of a random sequential update, where each
player on both equal networks receives a chance to pass its strategy once on average
during a full Monte Carlo (MC) step. The trials to pass strategy and to create or
delete the external links between the two networks are executed simultaneously, but
are independent from each other. System size was varied from L = 200 to 400 in
order to avoid finite size effects, and the equilibration required up to 105 MC steps.
Further simulation details are provided in the figure captions and the Results section,
as required. The main question to be answered is whether the simple coevolutionary
rule can lead to an optimal interdependence between the two networks, or whether the
system will drift towards an extreme state where either none or all possible external
links between the corresponding players are established. In what follows, we consider
parameters ∆ and wth as crucial to determine the outcome of the coevolutionary game,
while parameters α = 0.5 and K = 0.1 are kept constant without loss of generality. We
have verified that variations of both do not qualitatively change the presented results.
The critical temptation to defect b(K = 0.1) = 1.0357 at which cooperators die out on an
isolated square lattice is used as the benchmark for the effectiveness of interdependence
to promote cooperation passed the boundaries imposed by spatial reciprocity alone.
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Figure 1. Coevolution of cooperation and network interdependence promotes the
resolution of the prisoner’s dilemma and it allows the interdependence to self-organize
towards an optimal level. Panels in the upper row depict the color-encoded fraction of
cooperators ρC in dependence on the teaching activity threshold to create an external
link wth and the reward (punishment) for a successful (unsuccessful) strategy pass ∆
as obtained for b = 1.1 (a1,d1), 1.29 (b1,e1) and 1.31 (c1,f1). The second row depicts
the color-encoded fraction of players fw that fulfill the criterion w ≥ wth, and are thus
allowed to have an external link to the corresponding player in the other network, in
dependence on wth and ∆ (for the same values of b). The optimal interdependence
between the two networks is characterized by approximately half of the players being
allowed to have an external link to the other network. The bottom two rows depict
the same results, as obtained in the absence of coupling between the two networks
(α = 0) for b = 1.05 (a2,d2), 1.1 (b2,e2) and 1.15 (c2,f2). The comparison with the
results presented in the first two rows clearly demonstrates that the success-dependent
teaching activity alone is unable to maintain the high heterogeneity among players
that is needed to promote cooperation.
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3. Results
Colors maps presented in the top row (a1,b1,c1) of Fig. 1 encode the fraction of
cooperators ρC in dependence on the threshold for creating an external link wth and
the reward (punishment) for a successful (unsuccessful) strategy pass ∆ that increases
(decreases) the teaching activity of the corresponding players. These results provide
a comprehensive overview of the impact of the coevolutionary rule on the evolution
of cooperation for different values of the temptation to defect b. It can be observed
that, largely independent of the severity of the social dilemma determined by the value
of b, there exists a rather sharp threshold in ∆ beyond which cooperative behavior
is optimally promoted. The minimally required value of ∆ decreases slightly with
decreasing b, and for large values of b it also needs to be accompanied by an appropriate
intermediate value of wth. Actually, for all values of b the threshold of the teaching
activity wth should never be neither minimal nor maximal, but rather from within an
intermediate interval that becomes narrower as the temptation to defect increases. For
comparison, we also show in the third row (a2,b2,c2) of Fig. 1 the corresponding values
of ρC that are obtained when the coupling between the two networks is absent (α = 0).
Despite the fact that the value of w for each individual player can still evolve, the
success-dependent teaching activity alone is clearly unable to match the high levels of
cooperation that we report for the model entailing coevolution of strategy and network
interdependence in panels (a1,b1,c1). What is more, the three values of b in panels
(a2,b2,c2) are significantly lower than the values of b used in panels (a1,b1,c1), yet still,
in decoupled networks, cooperators may altogether fail to survive regardless of wth and
∆ (see c2).
The applied coevolutionary rule thus has the potential to resolve a social dilemma
well pass the boundaries imposed by traditional network reciprocity [we remind that the
critical temptation to defect at which cooperators die out on an isolated square lattice
is b(K = 0.1) = 1.0357] and previously proposed coevolutionary rules affecting only the
teaching activity of players. The question is what emergent system property is associated
with this observation? Colors maps in the second row (d1,e1,f1) of Fig. 1 encode the
average fraction of players that are allowed to have an external link to the corresponding
player in the other network fw, and they provide interesting clues as to a possible answer.
Since there is a strong correlation between the fraction of cooperators ρC and the fraction
of players that have the teaching activity w ≥ wth, the conclusion that imposes itself is
that it is in fact the level of interdependence that emerges between the two networks
that plays a key role in warranting an elevated level of cooperation. Only when the
self-organization of network interdependence leads to approximately half of the players
being allowed to form an external link is the cooperative behavior optimally promoted.
This interdependence corresponds rather accurately to the optimum reported in [67, 68],
only that here it emerges spontaneously from a completely non-preferential setup with
regards to strategy and without any interdependence being assumed in advance.
Why precisely the network interdependence self-organizes towards the optimal level
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Figure 2. Spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, whereby only the upper class
defines the interdependence between the two networks and is able to benefit from it. For
low values of the reward (punishment) for a successful (unsuccessful) strategy pass ∆,
the initial homogeneous distribution where every player is assigned w = wmin = 0.01
hardly changes towards the stationary state. Even after 106 full MC steps the majority
of players still have a marginal teaching activity, and for ∆ = 0.05 [panel (a)] actually
none are able to pass the applied wth = 0.5 threshold. If, on the other hand, ∆ is
above a certain value that we have emphasized in Fig. 1, the population segregates
spontaneously into players that retain the initially assigned low teaching activity and
players that enjoy w = 1 (and an external link to the corresponding player in the
other network since w ≥ wth). As can be observed in panel (b) (∆ = 0.4), the
middle class, i.e., players with wmin < w < 1, are practically non-existent as their
probability of emergence in the stationary state is P (w) < 0.1. This spontaneous yet
sharp segregation is crucial, as it directly postulates the self-organization towards an
optimal network interdependence. The applied temptation to defect in panels (a) and
(b) is b = 1.1. Panel (c) shows the stationary distribution of the teaching activity for
four different values of ∆ (see the legend), as obtained for b = 1.15. If the value of ∆
exceeds ≈ 0.15, the outcome is always a two-class society, with players belonging either
to the upper class and having w = 1 or to the lower class and having w = wmin. Panel
(d) shows the excess cooperation level in the “upper class society” in relation with the
average level in the whole system ∆ρC for the same parameters as used in panel (c).
If the threshold wth is not too small, the frequency of cooperators in the upper class,
i.e., among the players who are able to control their neighborhoods, is always higher
than the average.
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and which microscopic system property is responsible can be answered by studying the
evolution of the distribution of the teaching activity, as presented in Figs. 2(a) and (b).
For ∆ = 0.05 [panel (a)], which according to the results presented in Fig. 1 is too low to
have a noticeable impact on ρC and fw, the vast majority of players retains their initially
assigned minimal teaching activity w = wmin. A minor drift towards P (w) = 0.06 and
0.11 can be observed when the stationary state is approached, but importantly, none of
the players are able to pass the applied wth = 0.5 threshold. The two networks therefore
remain completely independent, and the evolution of cooperation on both proceeds as on
an isolated network. For ∆ = 0.4 [panel (b)], which is above the minimally required value
that can be identified in Fig. 1, the outcome is significantly different. The population
segregates into a two-class state. Players either have w = wmin or w = 1, but there is
very little in-between these two extremes. This is a direct consequence of the reward-
punishment mechanism that is utilized in the coevolutionary rule. As soon as a player
passes the teaching activity threshold wth to create an external link, its utility is likely
to increase further due to the external link to the corresponding player in the other
network. This in turn facilitates successful strategy passing, which in turn increases
the teaching activity further until the w = 1 limit is reached (or surpassed, in which
case the player is assigned w = 1). On the other hand, players whose teaching activity
does not exceed the wth threshold retain an evolutionary disadvantage, which makes
them likelier to fail passing the strategy to their neighbors. This in turn decreases their
teaching activity until the w = wmin limit is reached (as a technical note, we emphasize
that not online the multiples of ∆ plus w = wmin are possible, but in fact many other
values that emerge if the downgrade begins after the w = 1 limit is reached). There are
of course exceptions to these two most likely outcomes, and even after a player reaches
the maximal teaching activity it can still become downgraded to the lower class. Yet
such exceptions are rare, and when the stationary state is reached the two-class society
is the inevitable outcome if only ∆ is sufficiently large. This conclusion is supported
further by the stationary distributions of the teaching activity for several different values
of ∆, which are presented in Fig. 2(c). As a consequence, the players in the upper class,
and in particular their external links to the other network, give rise to the optimal
interdependence between the two networks for the resolution of the prisoner’s dilemma.
Our argument can be supported further if we compare the result with those obtained
where there is no interdependence between the two networks (α = 0) and the success
(or failure) of strategy passing can affect only the teaching activity of players. As the
bottom row (d2,e2,f2) of Fig. 1 shows, in this case the two-class society cannot evolve
because the success-dependent teaching activity coevolutionary rule alone is too fragile
to maintain the requested heterogeneity among players. Consequently, it is impossible
to observe such a significant improvement in the cooperation level as can be observed if
the interdependence between the two networks is allowed to emerge and coevolve.
The consequences of the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society for the
evolution of cooperation can be understood best from characteristic snapshots of the
square lattice, where the distribution of strategies is colored not only in a strategy-
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Figure 3. Heterogeneity and interdependent network reciprocity work jointly in favor
of the evolution of compact cooperative clusters. Cooperators satisfying w ≥ wth
and thus belonging to the upper class (depicted dark blue) are able to build up and
maintain sizable clusters of followers, although some cooperators there still belong to
the lower class (depicted light blue). Upper class defectors (depicted dark red), on
the other hand, fail to do likewise. Instead, they exploit their neighbors and suffer
the consequences of a negative feedback effect that downgrades them to lower class
(depicted light red). Panels (a-d) depict the characteristic stationary distribution of
strategies, as obtained for ∆ = 0.14, 0.15, 0.25 and 0.4, respectively. As soon as ∆
exceeds the required value [panels (c) and (d)], cooperators are able to spread across
the whole network. If the applied value of ∆ is too low [panel (a) and to a lesser
degree panel (b)], cooperators struggle to survive. These observations are also in full
agreement with the corresponding stationary distributions of the teaching activity in
Fig. 2(c). The applied temptation to defect is b = 1.15, the teaching activity threshold
for being allowed an external link is wth = 0.8, and the system size is L = 200.
specific way, but also in a w-specific way. In Fig. 3, cooperators (defectors) satisfying
w ≥ wth and thus having an external link are depicted dark blue (dark red), while
cooperators (defectors) failing to meet this criterion are depicted light blue (light red).
To facilitate the comparison, the presented snapshots correspond to the stationary
distributions of the teaching activity presented in Fig. 2(c). As can be observed, upper
class cooperators are masters in building up and maintaining large compact clusters
of followers. Defectors, on the other hand, fail to reap long-term benefits of being in
the upper class. They simply exploit their neighbors until they themselves become
downgraded to the lower class due to a negative feedback effect stemming from the
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Figure 4. With disrupted interdependent network reciprocity the evolution of
cooperation is impaired. Depicted is the fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence
on the reward (punishment) for a successful (unsuccessful) strategy pass ∆. If players
satisfying w ≥ wth form external links with randomly chosen players from the other
network [marked (r) in the figure legend], the rise of ρC as ∆ increases past the critical
value is lesser than if players form external links with the corresponding players from
the other network. Interestingly, the threshold also shifts towards larger values of ∆,
indicating that a stronger feedback in the teaching activity is needed to evoke the same
effect as when the interdependent network reciprocity can take full effect. The applied
temptation to defect is b = 1.12.
weakening of the neighbors (see also [72, 73] for related work on individual networks).
Consequently, the fraction of defectors among successful players is smaller then their
frequency in the whole society, as demonstrated by the results presented in Fig. 2(d).
The higher the value of ∆, which increases from panel (a) to (d), the more obvious the
origin of the evolutionary advantage of cooperators becomes. If ∆ is below a certain
value, the segregation of players is either completely absent or marginal [see ∆ = 0.14
and 0.15 curves in Fig. 2(c) and Fig. 2(a)], with the majority of players still retaining
their initially assigned minimal teaching activity w = wmin even in the stationary
state. Consequently, cooperators can take advantage neither from a heterogeneous state
nor from the interdependence between the two networks [65]. They therefore remain
bounded to isolated and relatively small [especially in panel (a) and to a lesser degree
also in panel (b) of Fig. 3] regions of the network where some individuals nevertheless
do succeed in fulfilling w ≥ wth (note that for ∆ = 0.14 and 0.15 a non-zero fraction
of players does satisfy w = 1). But once ∆ exceeds a threshold (see Fig. 1 for details),
the outcome is always a strongly segregated two-class society [see ∆ = 0.25 and 0.4
curves in Fig. 2(c) and Fig. 2(b)], which results in widespread cooperation, as depicted
in panels (c) and (d) of Fig. 3.
While the enhanced clustering of cooperators that sets in for sufficiently large ∆ is
akin to traditional network reciprocity [35], and in particular also to the mechanism that
is responsible for elevated levels of cooperation in highly heterogeneous environments
[74, 44, 75, 76], the self-organization of interdependence adds another layer of support to
the evolution of cooperation. To demonstrate this fact, we study an alternative model
where players satisfying w ≥ wth do not form an external link with the corresponding
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player from the other network, but rather with a randomly chosen player. This alteration
ought to disrupt interdependent network reciprocity [65], and as shown in Fig. 4 [see
label (r)] indeed it does. The jump upwards in ρC is significantly lower, and it occurs at
higher values of ∆, thus further corroborating the fact that the spontaneous emergence
of optimal network interdependence is crucial for the highly cooperative outcome of the
prisoner’s dilemma game.
4. Discussion
We have studied the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence with the
aim of establishing whether a simple coevolutionary rule can lead to the spontaneous
emergence of optimal conditions for the resolution of a social dilemma. Players were
allowed to form an external link with the corresponding player in the other network
only if they succeeded in maintaining their teaching activity above a certain threshold
wth. The teaching activity was increased upon each successful strategy pass by ∆,
and decreased by the same amount whenever an attempted strategy pass failed. We
have shown that due to coevolutionary rule the interdependence between networks
self-organizes so that approximately half of the players form an external link, while
the other half is denied participation in activities beyond their host network. This
level of interdependence corresponds accurately to the manually identified optimum
for deterring defection [67, 68], with the important difference that here it emerges
spontaneously from two initially completely independent networks.
In terms of the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma, we have assumed that players
that do have an external link may benefit from it by means of an increased utility,
but are not allowed to pass strategy across it. We have observed the spontaneous
emergence of a two-class society, where the upper class defined the interdependence
between the two networks and was able to enjoy the benefits of high teaching activity
and increased utility, while the lower class had to make do with low potency and lack of
benefits stemming from the interdependence. Remarkably, the middle class was found
to be practically non-existent. Despite the fact that the coevolutionary rule is strategy
independent, the spatial patterns have revealed that cooperators forge evolutionary
advantages from the upper class status much more effectively than defectors. While
the latter simply exploit their neighbors until they themselves become downgraded
to lower class (assuming they manage to get into the upper class to begin with),
cooperators work together to form compact clusters on both networks that further
reinforce themselves via interdependent network reciprocity [65]. As our simulations
have revealed, the cooperation level in the upper class is actually always higher than
in the whole population. For the coevolutionary rule to work optimally in favor of the
evolution of cooperation, ∆ has to be sufficiently large, i.e., comparable with the actual
teaching activity, while the threshold wth has to be neither too small nor too large.
These conditions ensure that the reward and punishment related to the successful and
unsuccessful strategy pass are sufficiently notable to take a rapid enough effect, as
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otherwise the feedback from the teaching activity and the interdependence might be
either too weak or too slow to notably affect the resolution of the social dilemma. It
is also important to emphasize that the coevolving teaching activity alone is unable to
produce the optimal two-class society within a network. The possibility to establish
an external link – the coevolution of interdependence between the two networks – is
thus an essential ingredient that is needed for the segregated society to emerge. With
these new insights, it is now possible to understand that the previously established
optimal strength of interdependence between networks implicitly generated the required
heterogeneity within a network for the optimal evolution of cooperation. We have also
shown that, if players are allowed to form external links with randomly chosen rather
than corresponding players from the other network, the evolution of cooperation is
significantly impaired, thus additionally highlighting the importance of interdependent
network reciprocity.
Presented results strongly corroborate the mounting evidence that the interdepen-
dence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual
network [8, 7, 26, 27]. We have studied the effects of the coevolution of teaching activity
on an isolated network before [72], and at that time we have shown that it leads to
the spontaneous emergence of highly heterogeneous states that promote the evolution
of cooperation [74, 44, 75, 76]. Here, the coevolution affects also the interdependence
between the two square lattices, and the positive effect on the evolution of cooperation is
indeed much stronger. In [72] we were unable to observe cooperation for b > 1.18, while
at present cooperators are able to match defectors in the occupancy of the population
even for b > 1.3. Under the same conditions the critical temptation to defect on an
isolated square lattice is b(K = 0.1) = 1.0357, so that thus both coevolutionary rules
markedly improve the survival chances of cooperative behavior, yet building also on the
interdependence between the two networks is significantly more effective still.
Awarding success is commonplace in human societies, as is punishing failure [77].
In this regard, the proposed coevolutionary rule captures an elementary ingredient of
real-life interactions, and in doing so demonstrates that this alone is sufficient to arrive
at a healthy level of interdependence between two initially independent populations.
We hope this will inspire more research aimed at understanding how the intricate
interdependence between many very different networks came to be. Taking into account
the aspect of growth as an ever present ingredient of individual networks [78, 79, 80]
might be particularly inviting, as this would enable a simultaneous study of the
emergence of network structure as well as network interdependence. While the former
is firmly established as an important factor for the outcome of evolutionary games,
and in general the subject is also thoroughly studied and well understood [32, 33, 34],
disentangling the role of network interdependence certainly merits further attention.
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